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Abstract: The energy trade is an important pillar of each country’s development, making up for the
imbalance in the production and consumption of fossil fuels. Geopolitical risks affect the energy trade
of various countries to a certain extent, but the causes of geopolitical risks are complex, and energy
trade also involves many aspects, so the impact of geopolitics on energy trade is also complex. Based
on the monthly data from 2000 to 2020 of 17 emerging economies, this paper employs the fixed-effect
model and the regression-discontinuity (RD) model to verify the negative impact of geopolitics on
energy trade first and then analyze the mechanism and heterogeneity of the impact. The following
conclusions are drawn: First, geopolitics has a significant negative impact on the import and export
of the energy trade, and the inhibition on the export is greater than that on the import. Second, the
impact mechanism of geopolitics on the energy trade is reflected in the lagging effect and mediating
effect on the imports and exports; that is, the negative impact of geopolitics on energy trade continued
to be significant 10 months later. Coal and crude oil prices, as mediating variables, decreased to
reduce the imports and exports, whereas natural gas prices showed an increase. Third, the impact
of geopolitics on energy trade is heterogeneous in terms of national attribute characteristics and
geo-event types.
Keywords: geopolitics; energy trade; fixed effect model; regression discontinuity design; event type
1. Introduction
The energy trade is easily affected by geopolitical risks (GPR for short). The production
and consumption of fossil fuels are unbalanced in various countries, which gives rise to the
energy trade between countries. The complex international energy trade constitutes the
existing complex international energy market. Since the 21st century, international political
and economic events have occurred constantly and geopolitical risks have fluctuated for a
long time, which have exerted a certain impact on the energy trade market and aroused
the attention of scholars around the world. It is generally believed that political risk is
a key factor to be considered in energy policy [1–3]. In recent years, emerging countries
have gradually become the main players in the international energy market. At the same
time, emerging countries are usually at the center of the geopolitical whirlpool. Although
relevant studies have been quite rich, they usually only analyze the relationship between
geopolitical risk and energy from the time dimension of years. At the same time, there
are few specific studies on the impact mechanism and heterogeneity, and the conclusions
are lacking accuracy and pertinence. Therefore, a more detailed study of the impact of
geopolitical risks on the energy trade of emerging countries is necessary.
The main work and marginal contribution of this paper is to study the effect of
geopolitical risk on energy trade, as well as mechanism research and heterogeneity analysis.
The details are as follows: First, the impact of geopolitical risks on energy trade imports
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and exports as a whole is measured and verified. Through the fixed effect model with
lag variables and the robustness test, excluding non-geopolitical factors, this paper finds
that geopolitical risk has a certain inhibitory effect on energy imports and exports of
emerging economies. Second, the impact mechanism of geopolitical risks on energy trade
in emerging economies is studied. On the one hand, the negative impact on both energy
exports and imports shows a short-term and medium-term lag; on the other hand, the three
major energy prices play a mediating role in the geopolitical impact on the energy trade.
Third, the heterogeneity of the geopolitical impact on the energy trade is studied. In a
study of country attributes, on the one hand, OECD member countries’ imports showed no
significant positive performance in the rise of geopolitical risks, but their exports declined
more; on the other hand, energy importing countries were more negatively affected in
geopolitical disputes. In a heterogeneous study of geopolitics’ impact on the energy trade
of emerging economies based on the difference of geopolitical event types, this paper finds
that there is indeed heterogeneity in geopolitical event types; that is, political events usually
lead to an increase in the energy trade, whereas social events and economic events lead to
a decrease in the energy trade.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows (see Figure 1 for the logical framework):
The third part is the econometric test of the impact of geopolitical risk on the energy trade.
The purpose is to empirically test the significance of the impact of geopolitical risk on the
imports and exports of the energy trade through sample data, econometric models, and
robustness tests. The fourth part is the mechanism analysis of the impact of geopolitical
risk on the energy trade, considering the lag effect and the mediating effect. The fifth part
is the heterogeneity analysis of the impact of geopolitical risk on the energy trade. The
heterogeneity of the impact of geopolitical risk on the energy trade in different samples is
studied first according to the national characteristics and attributes and then according to
different types of geopolitical events. The sixth part draws the basic conclusions.
Figure 1. The logical framework of this paper.
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2. Literature Review
Previous studies have shown that political risk affects energy trade in many ways. In
terms of energy demand, the normal production activities of a country may be affected by
the unstable macro environment, which will affect the energy input. Lee et al. used the
SVAR framework and found that the country risk reduced the country’s energy consump-
tion, thus further reducing the country’s dependence on global energy trade [2]; Kang and
Ratti adopted the economic policy uncertainty index as a risk indicator and discovered that
the positive impact on global real aggregate demand had a significant negative influence
on the uncertainty of U.S. economic policy, whereas the impact on specific oil demand
had an opposite effect [4]. Antonakakis et al. studied and showed that economic policy
uncertainty (oil price shock) had a negative response to aggregate demand oil price shock
(economic policy uncertainty shock) [5]. In terms of energy supply, high risks would lead
to stagnation of national energy production and supply activities, thus failing to stably
provide enough energy to meet domestic demand and foreign exports, such as in the
Iran–Iraq War and the Ukraine crisis [6]. The supply side shock of global oil production did
not have a significant impact on the economic policy uncertainty of the United States [4].
Zhang et al. found through gravity model analysis that importing countries were more
willing to import liquefied natural gas (LNG) from regions with a stable political environ-
ment, which may because they want to ensure the security of their energy supply [7]. Oil
importing countries are also concerned about energy supply security, as many oil exporting
countries are characterized by high levels of political instability [8]. In terms of energy
transactions, political risks can also affect global energy trade by influencing the energy
transport process, energy investment, energy prices, and other related factors [2,3,9–12].
Frontier and emerging countries tend to play different roles when geopolitical risks
occur. In the analysis of frontier countries, Mercille and Jones, who outlined radical
geopolitics, believe that America follows the geopolitical logic of “resolutely resisting any
challenge to American hegemony” to prevent the situation of “falling dominos,” “apples
in a barrel infected by one rotten one,” or “a growing cancer,” and the EU has abandoned
the agreement on the Iranian nuclear issue and failed to fulfill its obligations [13]. Some
geographers also discuss the role of oil in the US intervention in the Middle East [14,15].
The geopolitical and geo-economic group (the Three Seas Initiative), mainly composed
of post-communist NATO and EU member states, is highly dependent on NATO as a
protector, which is actually the U.S. protective umbrella [16]. The outbreak of the European
economic crisis foresaw the recovery of geopolitics in the analysis of trans-Atlantic foreign
policy, and the European Union was still in danger [17]. The development of political
framework conditions is currently facing far-reaching challenges in Europe [18]. The profit
is disproportionately distributed to the actors at higher levels in the supply chain [19].
Some structural problems have increased prominently in emerging countries in recent years.
In the face of geopolitical risks, emerging countries also face disagreement. Ferdinand
believes that from the perspective of geopolitics, although China continues to maintain a
high degree of domestic political stability, it has changed from a risk-averse country to a
risk-accepting country abroad [20]; China and Russia are to some extent against sanctions
imposed by Western countries [13]. According to information geopolitics, Russia does
not regard Internet governance, cyber security, or media policy as separate fields; on the
contrary, all fields covered by these disciplines fall under the category of “information
security” in Russia’s foreign policy and are strategically used to achieve geopolitical
goals [21]. Oral and Ozdemir believe that the political and economic policies carried out by
big powers for the sake of energy security put Turkey in a predicament [22]. As a link in
the political triangle between China, the United States, and India, India can play its own
balancing game to maximize its own interests. India’s pursuit of global power status will
be promoted through its efforts to achieve economic growth and military goals [23]. Suk
believes that South Korea is in a geopolitical environment and is forced by neighboring
powers to make a zero-sum choice, which actually means that South Korea’s foreign choice
is becoming an important factor determining the power map of the Eurasian continent [24].
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When geopolitical risks occur, different types of countries will show different reactions
in the energy trade according to the degree of their own interest correlation. In their
research on frontier countries and emerging countries, Simonia and Torkunov stated that
the main factor affecting the pricing of the global energy industry is geopolitics, and the
main “volcano” of its turbulence is the United States [25]. The member states of the Three
Seas Initiative are determined to reduce their dependence on natural gas from Russia and
Ukraine [16]. Oral and Ozdemir believe that since 70% of the world’s oil and gas reserves
are located near Turkey, in the context of energy geopolitics, Turkey’s most important
goal is to become the global energy trade center [22]. Oswald discussed the way out
when Mexico faces political risks and held that the oil price crisis opens the possibility
for Mexico to promote its abundant renewable energy potential [26]. When peak oil or
geopolitical issues drive oil prices to unrealistic levels, the industrialization of shale oil
will eventually occur, and for Brazil, shale oil can be used as a strategic resource [27].
Another important classification of energy trade is from the aspect of energy importing and
exporting countries. In a study on the heterogeneity of energy importing and exporting
countries, Lee et al. found that the unexpected positive impact of oil prices reduced
the country risk of net oil-exporting countries and increased the country risk of net oil-
importing countries [2]. The export volume is mainly affected by oil reserves and domestic
exports, whereas the import volume is mainly affected by the economic growth and oil
consumption of importing countries [28]. The country risk has a great impact on the trade
patterns of energy-importing and -exporting countries, and importing countries should
pay attention to the negative impact of economic risks, which reduces the importers’ anti-
control ability on resources and worsens its relationship with important countries. For
exporting countries, political and economic risks have a great negative impact on their total
trade volume and resource control ability [29].
The above studies provided reference experience and new ideas for this research.
3. Econometric Examination of the Impact of Geopolitics on the Energy Trade
3.1. Model Specification
The occurrence of geopolitical events will lead to the rise of geopolitical risks. The
severity of geopolitical risks will affect the normal activities of emerging economies and
inhibit energy trade among countries by impeding energy production, consumption, and
transportation. At the same time, the production and consumption of energy are unbal-
anced in each country, which leads to the difference between energy imports and exports.
If the global energy trade is simply regarded as a “zero-sum trade” without external im-
petus, emerging economies, frontier economies, and backward economies will reach the
equilibrium point of their energy imports and exports due to their development stages
and their positions in the energy market. In the current world of close connection, when
local geopolitical risks appear, countries in the risk vortex will be directly impacted, and
countries with a low correlation with the event will also show specific performance in
energy import and export due to political turmoil or energy price fluctuations in associated
countries. In general, instability will lead to the inhibition of production related to energy
input, and the energy production and supply chain will also be hindered.
In the past, international trade studies usually considered trade cost factors, such as
distance, transportation cost, and tax [30–32], but this study only examined the geopolitical
risk and energy import and export trade volume of an economy as a whole, and did not
distinguish the risk and trade between an economy and a single object. If we can measure
the geopolitical risk between the target economy and the specific object, this may be the
direction of further research in the future.
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This paper adopts a fixed effect regression model with lag explanatory variables to
test the impact of the geopolitical risk index on energy imports and exports of emerging
economies. Compared with the OLS estimation, the fixed effect model of time and individ-
ual can simultaneously control the influence of regional fixed factors that do not change
with time and macro factors that do not change with region on the regression results. The
regression model is as follows:
LnImportit = λ0 + λ1 * LnGPRit + λ2 * LnGPRi(t−1) + λ3 * LnGPRi(t−2) + λ4 * LnGPRi(t−3) + λ5Xit + ηt + πi + εit (1)
LnExportit = β0 + β1 * LnGPRit + β2 * LnGPRi(t−1) + β3 * LnGPRi(t−2) + β4 * LnGPRi(t−3) + β5Xit + ηt + πi + εit (2)
In Formulas (1) and (2), i represents individual country and t is the time of the
month; LnImport and LnExport are the explained variables, which are the logarithm of
energy imports and energy exports, respectively; and LnGPR is the explanatory variable.
Considering the lag effect of the impact, the LnGPR of (t−1)/(t−2)/(t−3) is included in
the regression; X is the covariate that may affect the imports and exports, including the
current GDP, real interest rate, and USD exchange rate of individual i at time t. LnGDP is
the covariate and the logarithm of GDP. In this paper, the monthly GDP of each country
is approved by frequency conversion of its quarterly GDP (source: World Bank), without
changing the trend. ηt is the time fixed effect, πi is the individual fixed effect, and εit is the
error term.
3.2. Variables and Data
Seventeen emerging economies were selected as the initial research samples. For
the purpose of more detailed verification of the impact, as well as for the availability of
the data, this paper includes monthly data from January 2000 to December 2020, most
of which actually start from January 2001 due to the lack of data. The GPR index, put
forward by Caldara and Iacoviello [33], quantifies the geopolitical risks of 19 emerging
economies through the analysis of newspaper articles from a specific period of time. It
now provides monthly data from January 1985 to February 2021, and it also provides
two decomposition indicators GPT and GPA, which will not be discussed in this paper
since they only focus on global data. Considering the availability of data (the monthly
data of the energy trade between Ukraine and Hong Kong are conspicuously missing),
this paper selected 17 samples: Turkey, Mexico, South Korea, Russia, India, Brazil, China,
Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela, Thailand, Israel,
Malaysia, and the Philippines. Data on energy imports and exports (USD) came from
the 27th category of the commodity codes HS from the International Trade Centre. This
category includes coal, coke and coal bricks, petroleum, petroleum products and related
raw materials, natural gas, and man-made gas and electric current, which can represent the
overall energy import and export level of the economy. A country’s monthly GDP (million
USD) is calculated by the frequency conversion of its quarterly GDP (source: World Bank)
without changing its trend. Current interest rates and exchange rates of sample countries
were obtained from Wind and EPU databases. The logarithm of trade volume is used in
most studies to mitigate the fluctuation trend of data and to alleviate heteroscedasticity to
a certain extent, because the trade volume gap between countries is generally large and
the discrete trend of data is strong. According to the standard practice, this paper adopted
a logarithmic treatment for the above data (except exchange rate and interest rate). Data
processing was completed by SPSS 24.0, Stata16, and Eviews11 software. Table 1 reports
the descriptive statistical results of the variables.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
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3.3. Results of the Econometric Tests
3.3.1. Empirical Results
This paper analyzed the impact of geopolitical risks on energy imports and exports
of emerging economies by using the fixed effect regression model (1) and (2) with lag
variables, especially focusing on the coefficient size and significance of the explanatory
variable LnGPR. In addition, a more stringent fixed effect PPML test was conducted to
verify the empirical results. The parameter estimation results from the model are shown in
Table 2.
Table 2. The impact of GPR on energy imports and exports.
LnImport LnExport
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LnGPR −0.146 * (−1.70) −0.069 ** (−2.19) −0.004 *** (−2.57) −0.036 (−0.37) −0.092 ** (−2.52) −0.004 *** (−2.71)
LnGPR _lag1 −0.085 (−0.92) −0.019 (−0.60) −0.001 (−0.74) −0.015 (−0.14) −0.048 (−1.23) −0.002 (−1.40)
LnGPR_lag2 −0.081 (−0.88) −0.024 (−0.74) −0.001 (−0.87) −0.029 (−0.28) −0.060 (−1.54) −0.003 * (−1.73)
LnGPR_lag3 −0.129 (−1.50) −0.027 (−0.91) −0.002 (−1.09) −0.070 (−0.71) −0.109 *** (−2.99) −0.005 *** (−3.28)
LnGDP 1.056 1.272 0.062 0.821 0.949 0.045
Interest rate −0.016 0.002 −0.000 −0.020 −0.018 −0.000
FX rate 0.000 −0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.001
Cons 11.332 7.693 2.353 12.671 12.226 2.594
Time control No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Individual control No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
N 4009 4009 4009 4009 4009 4009
F 353.22 934.54 - 184.81 451.31 -
R-squared 0.3819 0.3184 0.0299(Pseudo) 0.2443 0.1438 0.0309(Pseudo)
1 Notes: *, **, *** stand for significant levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, and the values in brackets are T-values.
As can be seen from Table 2, the GPR index had a significant negative impact on the
energy imports and exports of emerging economies. First of all, the rising geopolitical risks
could suppress emerging energy imports and exports, indicating that when geopolitical risk
occurs, the energy trade of emerging economies may affect the demand for energy input
due to the decline of domestic production [2], resulting in the stagnation of national energy
production and supplies so enough energy cannot be reliably provided to meet foreign
export supply [24]. Or it can inhibit global energy trade by affecting the energy transport
process, energy investment, energy prices, and other related factors [2,3,9]. Secondly, the
negative impact of geopolitical risk on energy exports of emerging economies was greater
than that on energy imports. If the global energy trade is simply treated as a “zero-sum
trade,” it can account for the negative impact on energy imports being greater than that on
exports when countries outside emerging economies are under the influence of geopolitical
risks. Thirdly, the restraining effect of geopolitical risk on energy trade volume was not only
reflected in the immediate occurrence of geopolitical risk, but also had a certain degree of
lag effect in the short term. The FE-PPML Models (3) and (6) verify the above conclusions.
3.3.2. Robustness Tests
First, we’ll address the test on non-geopolitical factors. The outbreak of the financial
crisis in 2008 affected the entire financial system and even the entire economic system,
regardless of geographical location or market development level [34]. Conceptually, the
crisis was not a geopolitical event, but after its outbreak, global energy prices plummeted,
and the energy trade market also suffered a certain impact. In order to exclude the
possibility that the change in energy trade volume was affected by the financial crisis, this
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paper took the outbreak of the financial crisis as the dummy variable Et; that is, before
September 2008, Et=0, and after September 2008, Et=1. The model is as follows:
LnImportit/LnExportit = λ0 + λ1 * LnGPRit + λ2 * Et + λ3 * Xit + ηt + πi + εit (3)
The variables in Formula (3) are consistent with the above, and the regression results
are shown in Table 3.
Table 3. The impact of GPR on energy imports and exports with Et.
LnImport LnExport
LnGPR −0.128 *** (−5.16) −0.184 *** (−6.06)
Dummy variable Yes Yes
Control variable Yes Yes
Time control Yes Yes
Individual control Yes Yes
1 Notes: *, **, *** stand for significant levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, and the values in brackets are
T-values.
As can be seen from Table 3, the direction and significance of the impact of geopolitical
risk on energy trade volume are consistent with the previous conclusion, which is robust.
Second, we will address the bootstrap test. The bootstrap method is used for resam-
pling with replacement to get more progressive and effective estimators. In this paper,
2000 repeated samples were used for regression coefficients, and the regression results are
shown in Table 4.
Table 4. The impact of GPR on energy imports and exports with bootstrap.
LnImport LnExport
LnGPR −0.103 *** (−4.20) −0.176 *** (−6.39)
Control variable Yes Yes
Time control Yes Yes
Individual control Yes Yes
1 Notes: *, **, *** stand for significant levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, and the values in brackets are
Z-values.
As can be seen from Table 4, the direction and significance of the impact of geopolitical
risk on energy trade volume are consistent with the previous conclusion, which is robust.
Third, we will address the grouping regression test. In order to eliminate the possibility
that periods of high and low geopolitical risks may differ in their impact on energy trade,
this paper conducted a group regression on GPR index referring to the idea of quantile
regression, considering the GPR indices of 0–10%, 10–25%, 25–50%, 50–75%, 75–90%, and
90–100%. The regression results are shown in Table 5.
As can be seen from Table 5, the overall direction of the impact of geopolitical risk on
the energy trade is basically consistent with the previous conclusion, and the conclusion is
still robust. In addition, in the period of middle and high geopolitical risk, geopolitical risk
had the greatest negative impact on energy import. In the period of moderate geopolitical
risk, geopolitical risk had the greatest negative impact on energy export.
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Table 5. The impact of GPR on energy imports and exports with regression by group.
Quantile of GPR 0–10% 10–25% 25–50% 50–75% 75–90% 90–100%
LnImport
LnGPR 0.048 −0.332 0.060 −0.154 −0.926 ** −0.045
LnExport
LnGPR 0.083 0.241 −0.607 * −0.587 * −0.528 0.082




1 Notes: *, **, *** stand for significant levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
4. Mechanism Study on the Impact of Geopolitics on the Energy Trade
4.1. Time Lag Analysis
Energy trade involves many factors, such as the international environment, geograph-
ical location, national strategy, and resource distribution of each country. Therefore, the
mechanism through which geopolitical risks affect the energy trade of emerging economies
is different. From the perspective of time lag, emerging economies usually maintain a
high growth rate, their demand for energy input is large, and their import orders are
rigid, which are difficult to shrink in the short term, whereas other countries (such as
frontier countries) respond more quickly to energy trade, so the inhibition effect on the
import volume of emerging economies is weak in the short term, and the short-term and
medium-term impact shows an upward trend, but the total impact is small compared to
that on the export volume. This paper conducted a 1–15-month lag test on energy imports
and exports of emerging economies. The estimated results are shown in Table 6.
It can be seen from Table 6 that the inhibiting effect of GPR on the energy imports and
exports of emerging economies had a significant time-lag effect in the short and medium
term, but the impact on the imports was weak in the short term, while showing an upward
trend in the short and medium term. The impact was smaller than that on export. Through
regression with more lag periods, it was found that the inhibiting effect of GPR on energy
imports and exports of emerging economies disappeared in about 12–13 months. It should
be noted that the above results were obtained by regression for each lag period. When
regression was used as explanatory variable at the same time, although the regression was
significantly decreased, it still showed a long-time lag effect.
4.2. Mediating Effect Analysis
From the perspective of energy price, previous studies usually used fossil fuels to
represent energy, including coal, crude oil, and natural gas with different forms and quality
levels [35,36]. Three fossil energy prices affect the energy supply and demand and turnover.
Coal and crude oil were the earliest energy sources to be exploited and used, and play
a crucial role in industry and transportation. However, natural gas is difficult to exploit,
transport, and store; its calorific value is low [37]; and it is weaker than the former two in
industry, so its mediating role may be different from the former two.
A mediating effect model [38] was constructed. Whether from the perspective of
logic or economics, there are endogenous problems between geopolitical risk and energy
price. Therefore, this paper combined the IV-2SLS method, taking LnGPR_lag1 as the tool
variable of the endogenous explanatory variable LnGPR to verify the impact of coal price
on energy imports and exports in emerging economies. In this paper, the monthly FOB
of the steam coal spot in Newcastle and Kembla Port, Australia, was selected to represent
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the overall coal price, which is expressed as Pc (price of coal). Taking the study of import
volume as an example, the mediating effect model is as follows:
LnImportit = λ0 + λ1 * LnGPRit + λ2 * Xit + εit (4)
LnPct = α0 + α1 * LnGPRit + α2 * Xit + εit (5)
LnImportit = γ0 + γ1 * LnGPRit + γ2 * LnPct + γ3 * Xit + εit (6)
where λ1 measures the impact of geopolitical risk on the import volume of emerging
economies, α1 measures the impact of geopolitical risk on coal price Pc, γ1 measures the
direct impact of geopolitical risk on the imports of emerging economies, and γ2 measures
the impact of coal price Pc on the imports of emerging economies. In this paper, the
regression coefficient was tested step by step. The meaning and calculation method
of variables in the regression equations were consistent with those in the discontinuity
regression. Due to the limitation of space, the mediating effect model with LnExport as the
explanatory variable and Pco and Png as the mediating variables will not be repeated, and
the form is consistent with Formulas (4)–(6). The regression results are shown in Table 7.
Table 6. The time lag effect of GPR on energy imports and exports.
LnImport LnExport
(1) (2)
LnGPR _lag1 −0.051 ** (−2.06) −0.124 *** (−4.00)
LnGPR _lag2 −0.048 * (−1.91) −0.127 *** (−4.11)
LnGPR _lag3 −0.044 * (−1.77) −0.139 *** (−4.47)
LnGPR _lag4 −0.047 * (−1.88) −0.137 *** (−4.44)
LnGPR _lag5 −0.054 ** (−2.15) −0.140 *** (−4.53)
LnGPR _lag6 −0.065 *** (−2.62) −0.125 *** (−4.03)
LnGPR _lag7 −0.066 *** (−2.64) −0.102 *** (−3.31)
LnGPR _lag8 −0.096 *** (−3.85) −0.107 *** (−3.47)
LnGPR _lag9 −0.104 *** (−4.17) −0.106 *** (−3.44)
LnGPR _lag10 −0.066 *** (−2.67) −0.099 *** (−3.21)
LnGPR _lag11 −0.069 *** (−2.77) −0.100 *** (−3.23)
LnGPR _lag12 −0.055 ** (−2.19) −0.076 ** (−2.44)
LnGPR _lag13 −0.038(−1.50) −0.060 ** (−2.28)
LnGPR _lag14 −0.017 (−0.69) −0.023 (−1.17)
LnGPR _lag15 −0.007 (−0.27) −0.011 (−0.58)
Control variable Yes Yes
Time control Yes Yes
Individual control Yes Yes
1 Notes: *, **, *** stand for significant levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, and the values in brackets are
T-values.
Table 7. Test results of the impact mechanism of GPR on energy imports and exports (Pc).
LnPc (1) LnImport (2) LnImport (3) LnExport (4) LnExport (5)
LnGPR −0.423 *** −0.617 *** −0.455 *** −0.494 *** −0.279 **
LnPc — — 0.341 *** — 0.453 ***
Control variable Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4009 4009 4009 4009 4009
R-squared 0.1618 0.3691 0.3777 0.2158 0.2285
1 Notes: *, **, *** stand for significant levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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As can be seen from Table 7, Model (2) verified the direct impact of geopolitical risk
on the imports of emerging economies. It can be seen from the results that the impact of
geopolitical risk on the imports was significantly negative, which is consistent with the
benchmark regression results. Model (1) verified the impact of geopolitical risk on coal
price Pc, and the regression coefficient was −0.423 and significantly negative, indicating
that geopolitical risk leads to a reduction in Pc. In Model (3), the coefficient of the impact of
geopolitical risk on the imports of emerging economies was −0.455, which was significant.
The impact of coal price Pc was significantly positive on the imports of emerging economies
at a confidence level of 1%, which means that a rise in coal prices will lead to a rise in
energy imports. In conclusion, it shows that the geopolitical risk suppressed the imports
of emerging economies partly through the reduction of coal prices. Similarly, combining
Models (1), (4), and (5), it is indicated that the suppression of geopolitical risk on the
exports of emerging economies was partly realized by reducing coal prices. At the same
time, this test showed that the supply and demand of coal markets in emerging economies
are inelastic [39].
Then, the Sobel test was used to verify the robustness of the mediating effect, and the
analysis results are consistent with the stepwise test. The total effect of GPR index on the
energy imports of emerging economies was −0.388, equal to a direct effect of −0.286 plus
a indirect effect of −0.102. The calculated mediating effect accounted for 26.31% of the
total effect, which means that coal price played a partial mediating role in the influence of
the GPR index on the energy imports of emerging economies. The total effect of the GPR
index on the energy exports of emerging economies was −0.306, equal to a direct effect
of −0.177 plus an indirect effect of −0.130. The calculated mediating effect accounted for
42.34% of the total effect, which means that the coal price played a strong mediating role in
the impact of the GPR index on the energy exports of emerging economies.
A mediating effect model was constructed to verify the impact of crude oil price on
energy imports and exports of emerging economies. Li et al. found that there was a strong
correlation between geopolitical factors and crude oil prices during a period of political
tension [40]. Faria et al. proved the positive correlation between China’s export growth
and oil prices by using a theoretical model [41]. In this paper, the monthly FOB of the Brent
crude oil DTD spot at the main port of the United Kingdom was chosen to represent the
overall crude oil price, which is expressed as Pco (price of crude oil). The regression results
are shown in Table 8.
Table 8. Test results of the impact mechanism of GPR on energy imports and exports (Pco).
LnPco (1) LnImport (2) LnImport (3) LnExport (4) LnExport (5)
LnGPR −0.425 *** −0.617 *** −0.429 *** −0.494 *** −0.220 *
LnPco — — 0.393 *** — 0.572 ***
Control Variable Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4009 4009 4009 4009 4009
R-squared 0.1320 0.3691 0.3809 0.2158 0.2368
1 Notes: *, **, *** stand for significant levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Table 8, combining Models (1), (2), and (3), shows that the suppression of geopolitical
risk on the imports of emerging economies was partly achieved by lowering the price of
crude oil. Similarly, combining Models (1), (4), and (5), it is shown that the suppression of
geopolitical risk on the exports of emerging economies was partly realized by lowering
the price of crude oil. At the same time, this test illustrated the inelasticity of supply and
demand in the crude oil market of emerging economies [42].
The Sobel test was used again to verify the robustness of the mediating effect, and
the analysis results are also consistent with the stepwise test. The total effect of GPR
index on the energy imports of emerging economies was −0.388, equal to a direct effect
of −0.272 plus an indirect effect of −0.116. The calculated mediating effect accounted for
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29.89% of the total effect, which means that the crude oil price played a partial mediating
role in the impact. The total effect of GPR index on the exports of emerging economies was
−0.306, equal to a direct effect of −0.144 plus an indirect effect of −0.162. The calculated
mediating effect accounted for 52.88% of the total effect, which means that the crude oil
price played a strong mediating role in the impact of GPR index on the energy exports of
emerging economies.
In order to verify the impact of natural gas price on energy imports and exports of
emerging economies, a mediating effect model was constructed. In this paper, the monthly
FOB price of the Russian produced natural gas spot from German ports was selected
to represent the overall natural gas price, expressed as Png (price of natural gas). The
regression results are shown in Table 9.
Table 9. Test results of the impact mechanism of GPR on energy imports and exports (Png).
LnPng (1) LnImport (2) LnImport (3) LnExport (4) LnExport (5)
LnGPR 0.104 ** −0.617 *** −0.524 ** −0.494 *** −0.321 ***
LnPng - - −0.120 *** - −0.066 ***
Control variable Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4009 4009 4009 4009 4009
R-squared 0.0295 0.3691 0.3936 0.2158 0.2173
1 Notes: *, **, *** stand for significant levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
By observing Table 9 and combining with Models (1), (2), and (3), it is shown that the
suppression of geopolitical risk on the energy imports of emerging economies was partly
realized through the increase of natural gas prices. Similarly, in combination with Models
(1), (4), and (5), it is shown that the suppression of geopolitical risk on the energy exports
of emerging economies was partly realized through the increase of natural gas prices. At
the same time, this test showed that the supply and demand of natural gas markets in
emerging economies are elastic [42,43].
Then, the Sobel test was adopted to verify the robustness of the mediating effect, and
the analysis results are consistent with the stepwise test. The total effect of GPR index on the
energy imports of emerging economies was −0.388, equal to a direct effect of −0.212 plus
an indirect effect of −0.176. The calculated mediating effect accounted for 45.36% of the
total effect. This means that natural gas price played a strong mediating role in the impact
of the GPR index on the amount of energy imports of emerging economies. The total effect
of GPR index on the energy exports of emerging economies was −0.306, equal to a direct
effect of −0.257 plus an indirect effect of −0.049. The calculated mediating effect accounted
for 16.01% of the total effect. This means that natural gas price played a partial mediating
role in the GPR’s impact on energy exports in emerging economies.
5. Heterogeneity Analysis of the Impact of Geopolitics on the Energy Trade
5.1. The Heterogeneity Analysis Based on the Differences of National Attributes
5.1.1. Whether an OECD Member or Not
Although the above results can be used to understand the impact of geopolitical risk
on the energy trade of emerging economies as a whole, the differences in national attributes
were ignored. For sample countries, whether they joined the OECD may have caused
differences in the impact of GPR on their energy trade, so it was necessary to analyze the
heterogeneity. From the perspective of national attributes, OECD member countries are
usually better than non-member countries in an international environment and energy
utilization, so the negative effects of geopolitical risks should be smaller. Previous studies
usually distinguished developed and developing economies based on whether they were
OECD members, and analyzed the heterogeneity on this basis. Sang-Ho and Kim found
that developed countries exported more carbon in their trade with OECD countries, but
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imported more carbon in their trade with non-OECD countries [44]. Developed countries
should subsidize underdeveloped countries to develop renewable energy [45]. In recent
years, the carbon-intensive behaviors of OECD member countries decreased and they
gradually increased the purchase of intermediate products and final products from non-
member countries, which is bound to lead to energy trade differences between the two
types of countries [46]. Wood et al. analyzed environmental issues in trade and found that
OECD member countries had higher energy efficiency than non-member countries [47].
The study by Niu et al. showed that compared with non-member countries, trade openness
has a better impact on OECD members [48]. All the above studies indicated that whether
an economy was an OECD member had an impact on its energy trade. Therefore, this
paper assumed that the geopolitical risk had less negative impact on the energy trade
of OECD members. OECD members in the sample of this paper were as follows: South
Korea (1996), Mexico (1994), Turkey (1961), Israel (2010), and Colombia (2020). For the
time span of this paper, only Israeli (2010 and after) and Colombia (2020 and after) were
regarded as OECD members, and the remaining emerging economies had not officially
joined the OECD. In this paper, the fixed-effect regression model was adopted to analyze
OECD member countries and non-member countries, and the estimated results are shown
in Table 10.
Table 10. Test results of the impact of GPR on the energy trade of OECD and non-OECD members.
OECD Members Non-OECD Members
LnImport LnExport LnImport LnExport
LnGPR 0.065 (1.37) −0.267 *** (−4.66) −0.162 *** (−5.55) −0.114 *** (−3.91)
Control Variable Yes Yes
Time Control Yes Yes
Individual Control Yes Yes
N 852 852 3157 3157
F 288.82 302.12 1337.06 699.41
R-squared 0.4196 0.6967 0.2824 0.1367
1 Notes: *, **, *** stand for significant levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, and the values in brackets are T-values.
As can be seen from Table 10, the impact of GPR index on the energy trade of emerging
economies was indeed heterogeneous in terms of whether they joined the OECD or not.
The increase in GPR had no significant negative effect on the energy imports of OECD
member countries, and even had a positive effect to some extent, which is consistent with
the hypothesis. However, surprisingly, the energy exports of OECD member countries
were more strongly affected by the negative impact of geopolitical risks. The reason may
be that the energy exports of OECD member countries, except Mexico, were smaller in
magnitude and those countries did not have to undertake the task of world energy supply,
so their energy exports fluctuated more in the impact of events. The geopolitical risk of non-
member countries dampened their energy trade by both imports and exports, consistent
with the baseline regression.
5.1.2. Energy Importing Countries and Energy Exporting Countries
Next, we analyzed whether the influence of GPR index on the energy trade of emerging
economies was heterogeneous between net energy exporters and net importers. Net energy
importing countries have a more passive and inferior position in international energy
trade compared to exporting countries, so the negative effects of geopolitical risks should
be greater. Hongwei et al., based on a complex network and panel regression analysis,
found the country risk had a great influence on the trade pattern of energy importers
and exporters [29]. Importing countries should pay attention to the negative impact of
economic risk, which will reduce the importer’s resource anti-control ability and worsen
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its relationship with important countries. For exporters, political and economic risks have
a negative impact on their resource control ability and the total energy trade volume. If the
net export value obtained by subtracting the energy import value from the energy export
value of the sample data is positive, the sample is an energy exporting country; otherwise,
it is an energy importing country. A fixed-effect regression model was used to analyze the
energy importing countries and energy exporting countries, and the estimated results are
shown in Table 11.
Table 11. Test results of the impact of GPR on energy importing and exporting countries.
Energy-Importing Countries Energy-Exporting Countries
LnImport LnExport LnImport LnExport
LnGPR −0.096 *** (−4.13) −0.261 *** (−5.85) −0.021 (−0.43) −0.115 *** (−3.91)
Control variable Yes Yes
Time control Yes Yes
Individual control Yes Yes
N 2280 2280 1729 1729
F 1449.70 526.34 565.53 593.27
R-squared 0.5419 0.4466 0.0472 0.3902
1 Notes: *, **, *** stand for significant levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, and the values in brackets are T-values.
It can be seen from Table 11 that there was heterogeneity in the impact of GPR index
on energy-importing countries and energy-exporting countries. The rise of GPR had a
significant negative impact on the imports and exports of energy-importing countries with
emerging economies. An increase in GPR had an insignificant negative impact on the
energy imports of energy-exporting countries with emerging economies and a significant
negative impact on their energy exports. In comparison, energy-importing countries were
more adversely affected by geopolitical disputes.
5.2. Heterogeneity of the Impact of Geopolitical Risks on the Energy Trade Based on Different
Geopolitical Event Types
When geopolitical risks occur, emerging economies will make discretionary decisions
on energy imports and exports based on the degree of correlation between energy trade and
their own interests. As relatively independent decision-making units, different emerging
economies have different reactions to the same geopolitical events, and the same emerging
economy also has different reactions when facing different geopolitical events. Therefore,
the impact of rising geopolitical risk caused by different types of geopolitical events on
energy trade of emerging economies is heterogeneous.
The rise of the geopolitical risk index is often closely related to the occurrence of
specific geopolitical events. Figure 2 shows the trend of the global GPR index provided
by Caldara and Iacoviello after January 2000. It can be found that the GPR index showed
great jumps at specific time points, such as 9/11 and the Iraq War. Although the occurrence
of different types of events leads to a rise in GPR, the impact of different types of events on
energy trade is bound to be heterogeneous, which is analyzed in the following paragraphs.
As can be seen from Figure 2, there was a certain number of “peaks” in the trend line
of GPR. In order to consider the heterogeneity of the impact of different types of geo-events,
this paper divided events into three categories according to their forms, namely, political
events, economic events, and social events.
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Figure 2. Composite GPR trend line.
The RD method was employed to test the impact of different types of geo-events on
the energy trade of emerging economies and analyze the heterogeneity. The RDD can
effectively analyze the causal relationship between event occurrence and energy imports
and exports by using realistic constraint conditions. When the random experiment is
not available, the RDD can avoid the endogenous problem of parameter estimation in
the analysis of specific geopolitical events so as to truly reflect the causal relationship
between the rise of GPR caused by geopolitical events and the energy imports and exports
of emerging economies, and the jump effect of events can be used to estimate the causal
relationship between them. The accuracy of the RD results is affected by the model setting,
to which the bandwidth is the key. In the selection of bandwidth, the IK method was used
to calculate the optimal bandwidth (OB) [49]. It is worth noting that the OB in this part was
5–7 months, which can represent the short term; the two times OB was about 10–14 months,
which can represent the medium and long term. According to the research of Lee and
Lemieux [50], the following model was constructed:
LnImportit/LnExportit = λ0 + λ1 * Eventit + λ2 * Yit + λ * Xit + πi + εit (7)
Eventit =
{
1, Yit > 0
0, Yit ≤ 0
where i represents an individual economy and t represents time; Eventit is the processing
variable, that is, when t is after the occurrence of the event, the value is 1, otherwise it is 0;
Yit is the execution variable, that is, the difference between t and the time of the event; X is
the covariable, including GDP, interest rate, and exchange rate; πi represents the individual
fixed effect; εit is the error term; and λ1 represents the impact of events on energy imports
and exports, which is the main concern coefficient. The RD in this part adopted this model,
which will not be repeated. Sensitivity analysis can be used to further enrich and move
variable events forward or backward. This can help draw conclusions about the potential
anticipated (or postponed) effects of the event [51]. However, because of the length limit,
this paper only conducted regression discontinuity for the time point of the event.
In addition, energy prices and elasticity of supply and demand were also taken into
account when analyzing the impact of different types of geopolitical events. Combined
with the above mediating effect test, it was found that energy prices played a mediating
role in the process of geopolitical risks affecting energy trade. The selection of energy prices
continued to follow the three energy prices mentioned above, and the monthly trend is
shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Energy price trend line.
Next, this paper carried out the RD for political events, social events, and economic
events to analyze the heterogeneity of the impact on energy trade based on the different
geo-event types.
5.2.1. RD Analysis of Political Events
This paper selected the Arab Spring as representative of political events and used the
RD for analysis. The Arab Spring was a wave of revolutions in the Arab world, with the
civil war in Syria and the war in Libya being the main parts. The Syrian civil war usually
refers to the conflict between the Syrian government, the Syrian opposition groups, and the
Islamic State that started at the beginning of 2011. The anti-government demonstrations
in Syria started on 26 January 2011 and escalated on 15 March 2011, and then the anti-
government demonstrations evolved into armed conflicts. The Libyan War was an armed
conflict that occurred in Libya in 2011, often referred to as the “February 17 Revolution”
in Libya. The fighting was between the government, led by Muammar Gaddafi, and the
forces against him.
On the energy level, Libya was the most affected by the Arab Spring movement. Its
oil production was affected by the twists and turns, which lasted for a year: According
to OPEC data, the production of Libyan crude oil was 1.6 million barrels per day (KBD)
before January 2011, but it fell sharply after February, with a crude oil output of 375 KBD
in March. By July, the crude oil production had reached a bottom, with only 7000 barrels
per day. In May 2012, its crude oil production was back to 1441 KBD. On 14 April 2018,
the United States, Britain, and France launched air strikes in Syria. The events related to
this section were the Syrian and Libyan Wars (March 2011), the escalation of the Syrian
War (September 2013), and Syrian tensions (April 2018). This paper conducted a sharp
RD analysis of three events, analyzing the heterogeneity of the whole sample, and energy
importing countries and energy exporting countries affected by the event before and after
the event. Tables 12–14 report the results of the RD, and Figures 4–6 show the energy price
changes before and after the event.
As can be seen from Table 12, the outbreak of wars in Syria and Libya increased the
energy imports of energy-importing countries in the short term, as well as increased the
energy imports of all of the sample countries and the energy-importing countries in the
long term, and it also promoted energy exports insignificantly. Combined with Figure 4,
we found that world energy prices rose sharply throughout the Arab Spring, with crude oil
prices peaking in May and coal prices continuing to climb. The rise in energy price in the
short term was the direct cause of the increase in energy imports from energy-importing
countries in the short term. In the medium and long term, energy prices continued to rise
during the turmoil in the Middle East and maintained for a long time after reaching a peak
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in May, which directly led to a significant increase in energy trade volume in the medium
and long term. Energy demand showed a strong rigidity.
Table 12. The impact of the Arab Spring.
Sample LnImport LnExport
OB 2 * OB OB 2 * OB
All 0.010 0.119 * 0.048 0.024
Energy-importing 0.130 * 0.160 *** - -
Energy-exporting - - 0.002 0.021
Individual control Yes Yes
Control variable Yes Yes
1 Notes: *, **, *** stand for significant levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Table 13. The impact of the Syrian War escalation.
Sample LnImport LnExport
OB 2 * OB OB 2 * OB
All 0.026 −0.006 −0.036 −0.019
Energy-importing 0.013 −0.055 - -
Energy-exporting - - 0.009 0.033
Individual control Yes Yes
Control variable Yes Yes
1 Notes: *, **, *** stand for significant levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Table 14. The impact of Syrian tensions.
Sample LnImport LnExport
OB 2 * OB OB 2 * OB
All 0.115 ** 0.108 *** 0.059 0.025
Energy-importing 0.134 ** 0.112 ** - -
Energy-exporting - - 0.010 0.051
Individual control Yes Yes
Control variable Yes Yes
1 Notes: *, **, *** stand for significant levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Figure 4. Energy price around March 2011.
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Figure 5. Energy price around September 2013.
Figure 6. Energy price around April 2018.
It can be seen from Table 13 that the escalation of the Syrian War had no significant
impact on the energy trade of emerging economies in the short and medium term. The
turmoil in the Middle East has lasted for a long time, and neighboring countries have
gradually adapted to the political environment. At the same time, Syria is located in the
Middle East, but it is not an oil producer, and its escalation has not affected the energy
supply in the region. Energy price volatility also flattened, as shown in Figure 5.
As can be seen from Table 14, the tension in Syria in 2018 significantly increased energy
imports for all of the sample countries and energy-importing countries in the short and
medium term, and it also increased energy exports to a certain extent. Figure 6 shows that
energy prices continued to rise over the medium to long term, reaching a peak in October
2018. The price rise directly led to the short-term and long-term increase in energy imports.
Although the price fell after October, it did not change the jump trend of energy imports
before or after the discontinuity.
This paper also analyzed political events such as the Iraq War, the increase in troops in
Afghanistan, and Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and the conclusion is consistent with the
previous analysis. Generally speaking, the occurrence of serious political events tends to
lead to regional political instability. Therefore, the price of fossil energy will be increased,
thus increasing the energy trade volume of emerging economies.
5.2.2. RD Analysis of Social Events
In this paper, the outbreak of the COVID-19 virus in January 2020 was selected as the
representative of social events, and the RD method was used for analysis. The first case
of COVID-19 was detected in Wuhan, China, in December 2019. Since then, the disease
spread around the world, leading to a continuing pandemic. According to the U.S. Energy
Information Administration’s (EIA) Annual Energy Outlook 2021 (AEO2021), released on
February 3, 2021, it may take several years for the United States to return to 2019 levels
of energy consumption and carbon dioxide emissions due to the impact of COVID-19 on
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the U.S. economy and the global energy sector. EIA Acting Administrator Stephen Nalley
said that it will take years for the U.S. energy industry to reach its new normal. In 2020, the
epidemic triggered a historic energy demand shock, leading to reductions in greenhouse
gas emissions, reduced energy production, and volatile commodity prices. The pace of
economic recovery, technological advances, changes in trade flows, and energy incentives
will determine how the world produces and consumes energy in the future. In this paper, a
sharp RDD was performed to analyze the heterogeneity of the event impacts on the whole
sample, as well as energy-importing countries and energy-exporting countries before and
after the event. Table 15 reports the results of the regression, and Figure 7 reports the
energy price changes before and after the event.
Table 15. The impact of COVID-19.
Sample
LnImport LnExport
OB 2 * OB OB 2 * OB
All −0.169 ** −0.222 *** −0.051 −0.148 **
Energy-importing −0.241 *** −0.272 *** - -
Energy-exporting - - 0.148 0.069
Individual control Yes Yes
Control variable Yes Yes
1 Notes: *, **, *** stand for significant levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Figure 7. Energy price around January 2020.
It can be seen from Table 15 that the impact of the COVID-19 outbreak on energy
trade was reflected in the short-, medium-, and long-term inhibition of the overall energy
imports of energy-importing countries, while significantly inhibiting the overall energy
exports in the medium and long term. At the same time, it can be found from Figure 7
that energy prices fell sharply near the discontinuity, which was the direct reason for the
decline in energy imports and exports in the short term. In addition, due to the obstacles of
trade circulation caused by the epidemic and the uncertainty of the future of production
activities, energy demand was bound to be lower than before the outbreak.
This paper also analyzed social events such as the Fukushima nuclear leak and the
Ebola outbreak, and the conclusions are largely the same as the previous ones. In general,
when serious social events occur, public safety is seriously threatened. The collapse
of energy prices and the sharp decline in demand together lead to a decline in energy
trade volume.
5.2.3. RD Analysis of Economic Events
In this paper, the United States–China trade friction was selected as representative
of economic events, and the RD method was used for analysis. On 1 August 2019, due
to the Trump administration’s dissatisfaction with the Chinese government’s purchase
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process of U.S. agricultural products, former President Trump announced on Twitter that
he would impose a 10% tariff on all remaining USD 300 billion of Chinese imports to the
US starting from 1 September 2019. On 5 August, the RMB exchange rate against the USD
fell below 7. On the same day, the US Treasury announced that China was listed as a
currency manipulator. Subsequently, the Chinese government announced a suspension of
the purchase of American agricultural products. On 24 August, it announced additional
tariffs of 10% or 5% on USD 75 billion of U.S. goods and resumed additional tariffs on U.S.
cars and parts. The United States responded the next day by imposing a 15% tariff on USD
300 billion of Chinese goods and a 25% tariff to 30% tariff on USD 250 billion of Chinese
goods, which was later shelved. In this paper, a sharp RDD was performed to analyze
the heterogeneity of the event impacts on the whole sample, as well as energy-importing
countries and energy-exporting countries before and after the event. Table 16 reports the
results of the regression, and Figure 8 reports the energy price changes before and after
the event.
Table 16. The impact of U.S.–China tensions.
Sample
LnImport LnExport
OB 2 * OB OB 2 * OB
All −0.093 * −0.021 0.009 −0.040
Energy−importing −0.131 ** −0.047 − −
Energy−exporting − − 0.006 −0.062
Individual control Yes Yes
Control variable Yes Yes
1 Notes: *, **, *** stand for significant levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Figure 8. Energy prices around August 2019.
As can be seen from Table 16, the impact of the U.S.−China trade friction on energy
trade was reflected in the short-term reduction in the total sample and energy imports
of energy-importing countries, and in the medium and long term, there was a certain
inhibitory effect on energy imports and exports. The World Bank issued a report on
29 October 2019, saying that, affected by the decline in demand caused by the weak global
economic growth prospects, the prices of energy, metals, and other commodities would
“fall sharply” in 2019, as evidenced by the significant decline in energy prices in Figure 8.
John Yergin, Chairman of Cambridge Energy Research Associates, said that at present,
the growth in China’s demand is the basic driving force to promote the world oil market.
The trade frictions between China and the United States also dampened China’s energy
imports to some extent.
After that, we analyzed the global economic crisis caused by the 2008 financial crisis
and the subsequent European debt crisis, and this paper reached the same conclusion as
above. In general, the occurrence of serious economic events will generally lead to the
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suppression of the energy trade, and the decline in prices and trading volume is the main
reason for the short-term decline in energy trade volume.
In conclusion, there is indeed heterogeneity in the impact of geopolitical risks caused
by specific events on the energy trade of emerging economies, which is reflected in the
heterogeneity of the types of geopolitical events. First, political events lead to rising
energy trade by increasing energy prices. International political events usually accompany
the threat of war between countries or even direct conflicts, bringing serious tension to
the region. This has caused the shortage of energy supplies to a large extent, and the
price of energy increases with it, but the rigidity of energy demand prevents the imports
from decreasing significantly. Second, social events lead to a decline in energy trade
volume by reducing energy prices and demand. Major social events lead to a cessation
of normal domestic production activities and a reduction in energy demand. Meanwhile,
the uncertainty of the future situation also leads to a withdrawal in the long-term in the
spot and futures market and falling prices. Finally, economic events lead to a decrease in
energy trade volume by reducing energy prices and energy transaction volume. Modern
major economic events include international trade friction between the big powers or
international trade sanctions, along with the limitations of commodity imports and exports
and the deterioration of business environment, with which the energy trade decreases
significantly and energy prices keep falling.
6. Conclusions and Implications
Firstly, rising geopolitical risks have a significant negative impact on the energy trade
of emerging economies. On the one hand, rising geopolitical risks have significantly
reduced energy imports and exports in emerging economies. On the other hand, the rising
geopolitical risk has a more negative effect on the energy exports of emerging economies
than on the energy imports. Besides, the inhibitory effect still exists after excluding non-
political factors, sample size, and grouping bias.
Secondly, there is a time-lag effect and a mediating effect on the impact of the rising
geopolitical risks on emerging economies’ energy trade. First, the negative impact on
energy exports and imports shows a short-term and medium-term lag effect, in which
the lag effect of imports is weak in the short term, and the short-term and medium-term
impact shows an upward trend, and the impact on imports is smaller than that on exports.
Second, the inhibition of geopolitical risks on the energy imports and exports of emerging
economies is partly realized by reducing the prices of coal and crude oil and partly achieved
by raising the price of natural gas.
Finally, the impact of geopolitical risks on energy trade is heterogeneous, which is
reflected in the differences of national attributes and types of geopolitical events. First,
compared to non-OECD member countries, the energy imports of OECD member countries
had no significant positive performance when GPR increased, but the energy exports
decreased more; second, the net energy importing countries were more negatively affected
when the geopolitical risks rose; third, political events usually led to an increase in energy
trade, whereas social events and economic events usually led to a decrease in energy trade.
The conclusions of this paper can be used as a reference for the energy trade strategy
of emerging economies. First of all, the analysis of this paper shows that geopolitical risk
has a negative impact on the energy trade of emerging economies from all perspectives.
Therefore, emerging economies should try to avoid geopolitical risks in the international
energy trade and work together to create a stable and harmonious international environ-
ment. Second, energy-importing and -exporting countries should make targeted strategic
adjustments according to their own situations. The empirical results show that importing
countries are more negatively affected by geopolitical risks than the exporting countries.
They should enrich their own import channels, reduce the dependence on energy imports
from specific countries, strengthen their own anti-control abilities of resources, and con-
sider relying on international cooperation organizations to enhance their status in the
energy market if conditions permit. Energy exporters also suffer losses in geopolitical risks,
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which can be explained by the inhibition of energy exports of emerging economies faced
with geopolitical risks. Therefore, energy-exporting countries should enrich their export
channels, combining fiscal policies to expand domestic demand to reduce their depen-
dence on foreign trade, stimulating domestic consumption, driving industrial growth, and
promoting internal energy consumption. Finally, emerging economies should formulate
appropriate policy strategies in the face of different types of geopolitical events [52], and
make discretionary decisions in terms of energy import and export in the long term and
short term. Overall, emerging economies need to focus on the following three perspectives:
implementing short-term, medium-term, or long-term regulatory policies and strategies on
the trade, diplomacy, and supply side; improving the pertinence of response measures and
gradually stabilizing their cooperation in the international energy market; and maintaining
the harmony of geopolitical relations in a long-term and stable way.
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